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Toward a New Egypt: A 
Special Presentation by 
Dr. H.A. Hellyer 
As an academic, I have often researched moments of history and written about them. As a 
political commentator, I analyse contemporary instants that I feel might be of interest to 
people around the world. But invariably, while I might be in the midst of a fascinating 
general election in the UK, or certain controversies in the Muslim world, I’ve never had the 
opportunity to be at the centre of something that history records as deeply significant. 
From mid December 2010 till mid January 2011, I was in Cairo, Egypt; around 20 minutes 
or so away from Tahrir Square. Tahrir means ‘liberation’ in Arabic, and the ‘Square of 
Liberation’ was a fitting place for the January 25th revolution of Egypt to take place.  
Over the course of my life, I have spent many years living in Egypt. Some consecutively, 
most not — and I, like most people who lived or visited Egypt, had little expectation of their 
being any propensity for change in the political arena. Even after Ben Ali fled Tunisia, I was 
extremely skeptical that Egypt would change. In fact, the day before, on January 24th, I 
published an article in a newspaper in the Arab world, where I argued that the region did not 
need revolution, but vision. My reasoning was fairly simple — a huge state, whether it is 
dictatorial in nature or not, causes civil society to disengage at best, and to disintegrate at 
worst. This was certainly the case in Egypt, and as such, I believed that if the state just 
disappeared overnight, there would likely be chaos. Moreover, I never believed a protest 
movement could actually protest for so long without violence erupting all over the country — 
whether due to the protestors or  to the security forces that refused to give in. 
I think most people in Egypt would have agreed with me on January 24th. Within a few 
days, I changed my mind. I still think my concerns were correctly placed. But something 
extraordinary happened in Egypt — something that no one, not even those who went out onto 
the streets on the 25th of January, really thought possible. And within a few days, I believed 
that Tahrir Square could change Egypt — and the region — forever. Tahrir Square was a 
movement for many people — and everyone had their own concerns. But there were some 
things that were clear, which are extremely pertinent to students and scholars of law alike. 
One has to remember that Egypt is the country where we have the first records of law-
making in human history. As far back as 3000 B.C., the country had a civil code that was 
broken up into probably a dozen books. 
The first is that the law can be an oppressive as well as a coercive procedural force, but its 
ultimate aim can never, a priori, be an unjust one. The rights to protest and gather were 
rights granted by the Egyptian constitution, and this was something that numerous legal 
authorities pointed out during the uprising. The state had, and has, the responsibility to limit 
such right under certain circumstances, but they would have to justify them appropriately — 
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and the manner in which the state did in Egypt left nothing to law, and all to arbitrary 
political power.  
The second is that all societies do, in fact, need laws — and that the desire to have laws 
and regulations, as a part of social order, is a natural aspect of civilised societies. Eventually, 
Tahrir Square was so full of people, who were there over a consistent period of time, that a 
mini, almost autonomous zone existed therein. The military did control access points — but 
beyond those access points, the protestors were in charge. The mini-state they set up within 
Tahrir Square was one that called for no arms, (and so they patted down everyone coming in) 
insisted on social justice (and thus people were feeding each other), and required respectful 
relations between all people, regardless of religion or class. Interestingly enough for students 
of libertarianism and the philosophy of law, none of this was compulsory, except for the no 
arms rule, and where respectful relations were transgressed in a way that caused danger, the 
Square would cordon off the offending party, peacefully, but quickly.  
There were other autonomous zones in Egypt during the uprising. The government had 
called for the police to go home and institute martial law. At the same time, thugs aligned 
with pro-government forces were loose on the streets, terrorising people — and suspiciously, 
prisoners had been let out of jail. I remember that first night very clearly, and how surprised 
I was when I went out onto the street, instinctively to protect my family by standing guard — 
and finding that I was not alone. There were many of us. Most able-bodied men descended 
onto the streets around their homes and within their neighbourhoods and began to institute 
new laws, to protect themselves. We formed checkpoints and established teams who would 
check cars coming into the neighbourhoods or onto our streets — some of whom would check 
the drivers’ licenses, and others who would search the cars. We had no legal authority to do 
this, but we deemed ourselves to be acting in accordance with natural law, and no one whom 
we stopped objected in the slightest. No one was threatened in any way — on the contrary, 
everyone acted with good manners — but everyone knew that for the benefit of all of us, 
whether at the checkpoints or in the cars, it was in the interest of everyone that we assume 
positions of authority. We were not chastised for these extra-legal actions — we were 
applauded by everyone who came into our streets and districts.  
Law is usually enforced and devised through a set of institutions in a society, which are 
designed to mediate relations between people when they disagree. Those institutions in Egypt 
had broken down long before January 25th — the rule of law had been systematically 
degraded through corruption, brutality and political repression. The judiciary’s impartiality 
and independence had been damaged a long time ago, and it was not getting much better. 
The legislature was hardly a representative one, as the ruling party repressed alternative 
voices, and used corrupt means to ensure their voice was heard above all others. As for the 
executive, no one could consider that it was accountable. The rule of law in such a situation 
was, one could argue in hindsight, an unsustainable concept. The consistent and continuous 
rule of law requires certain institutions that have popular consent to be in operation. 
Particularly after the uprising of January 25th, with the response of the state against the 
protestors, it became clear that these institutions had neither independence nor popular 
consent — and that a major obstacle to them regaining such characteristics was the presence 
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of the regime of Hosni Mubarak. For the rule of law to endure in Egypt after the popular but 
peaceful uprising, it seemed unavoidable to have him step down. 
Fortunately for the people of Egypt, unlike the people of Libya, that was possible through 
the intervention of the army. The military also has a code of law — a military code, which 
forbids the targeting of unarmed civilians. The widely held suspicion in Egypt was that the 
regime ordered the military to open fire on the protestors. When they refused, the regime’s 
days were numbered — it was no longer a question of if, but when. That military force forced 
Hosni Mubarak to step down on February 11th, 2011 — and a new era for Egypt began, 
under military rule and martial law. 
The first major policy step of the military was a legal-related one — it convened a group of 
legal experts to formulate amendments to the constitution that would pave the way for the 
election of a new president (the previous constitution had essentially made that impossible). 
One of the most controversial clauses for the liberals of Egypt has been the clause that 
identifies Islam as the ‘religion of the state’ — in other words, establishing the principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence as ‘natural law’ — again, bringing law and jurisprudence into the real 
world in a way that would have been unthinkable only months ago. It’s a clause that has 
immense popularity in this religiously conservative country, even while political Islamism is 
not likely to take control of any executive. Egypt is very Muslim — but not entirely 
enamoured with Islamism. 
But regardless of all of that, on February 11th, Hosni Mubarak, the president of Egypt 
since 1981, stepped down — and on the 19th of March, the people of Egypt had a free and 
democratic referendum on constitutional amendments — the first they had ever had. The 
Egyptian revolution continues, and one hopes that wherever it ends up, the rule of law is a 
fundamental characteristic of the new Egypt.  
 
  
